Rad Plan Profile Selection Voting Mechanism and Method

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The chosen voting mechanism will be used 2x per annual cycle, starting with the 2015-2016 cycle. Once to select the short-list of profile proposals. Once to select the final (detailed) profile proposals.

Dates:

May 11th - Tcon discussion in IHE Rad Planning Committee (See meeting minutes: Rad Plan Minutes 2015-05-11)
May 25th - Deadline to comment on these proposals
June 8th - Comments will be incorporated
June 15th - Deadline to submit letter ballot (using usual majority rule) on preferred voting mechanism and method (Eligible Member Organizations can vote here: Google Form Ballot )

IHE Rad Proposed Profile Voting Mechanism (how to vote)

Do not edit this section. If you would like to add comments or clarifications, please do so in the comment section.

  • Typically 2 or 3 profiles are selected per year, so it is not our usual “straight up, single winner, majority rules” voting process.
  • Two alternatives are proposed for the Profile Voting Mechanism.
1.) Current Voting Mechanism: Simple Condorcet
  • Each voter ranks all choices sequentially (a unique value n for each of n options; highest value to first choice)
  • The choices with the highest vote totals win.
  • For example, if there are 6 profile proposals, each voter casts a vote from A (highest, worth 6 points) to F (lowest, worth 1 point) for each proposal.
  • Requiring all voters to support all choices to some degree has the unfortunate side effect of minorities being disenfranchised by majorities, since for example the marginal support of a minority for a third choice of the majority (unintentionally) outweighs their support of the minority for their own first or second choices.
2.) Proposed Voting Mechanism: modified Borda Count
  • Intended to allow reasonably sized minority groups to be represented in the winning choices.
  • First select the number of "choices" (x), e.g., 1, 2, 3 or 4 profiles
  • Calculate (x-1)**2. That is the points assigned to the first choice. Subsequent choices get half the points of the prior.
  • The choices with the highest vote totals win.
  • For example, to select 3 profiles, (3-1)**2 = 4. Then, each voter ranks three choices:
  • One choice worth 4 points
  • One choice worth 2 points
  • One choice worth 1 point
  • Consider simplicity, clarity, transparency, efficiency and susceptibility to strategy
  • Mechanism comparison for example of 8 proposals with up to 3 winners
Current Voting Mechanism Proposed Voting Mechanism
# of votes Everyone votes for every proposal Everyone votes for their top 3 choices
Vote weights 8,7,6,5,4,3,2,1 4,2,1
Winner 3 highest totals 3 highest totals



Comments

Add your comments by editing this section.

Your name Date Comment Proposed Change
Teri Sippel Schmidt May 12, 2015 The modified Borda method requires the number of profiles to be selected is known in advance which is not possible since the TC may not have yet established a percent of effort. Set, but declare, the number of votes in advance. For long list, set at 4 or 5 votes. For short list set at 3 votes, period.
Kevin O'Donnell May 12, 2015 Agree with proposal. The method requires we select the number of proposals a voter may choose. The tally will produce an ordered set of winners. We can take winners until they reach our effort threshold just like we do for Condorcet which produces n winners.
Chris Carr May 12, 2015 Since the description above includes a purported deficiency of the Condorcet method, which the committee has used over the last few cycles, let me counter with some of its virtues: simplicity, clarity, transparency and efficiency. I would also counter the argument that the Borda method protects the claims of minorities by pointing out that there is a tension between the claims of minorities and the communal motivation of the committee and that, in this context, highly motivated minorities may be more inclined to promote narrowly focused interests that are less likely to lead to successful outcomes for the broader community. Finally, history suggests that implementing finely engineered solutions for issues in human behavior seldom leads to the intended results. Stick with what we've got.
Chris Carr May 12, 2015 Ok, while I'm on the offensive, here is a critique of the Borda method from a site dedicated to comparing methods of voting (fairvote.org): "Because it is highly susceptible to strategy, {the Borda method} is most suitable for elections by impartial judges, rather than voters with a stake in the outcome."
Kevin O'Donnell May 21, 2015 Might be clearer to compare a concrete example. Show comparison of concrete example.
Example name May 12, 2015 Example Comment Proposed Change

IHE Rad Proposed Profile Voting Method (how ballots are cast)

Do not edit this section. If you would like to add comments or clarifications, please do so in the comment section.

The voting method is how ballots are actually cast.

The plan is to continue holding a Webex to present, understand and discuss the profile proposals. Afterward, voters submit their ballot using a Google form and are tallied by RSNA Staff (Jamie Kontos or Chris Carr).

1.) Live voting: Eligible members of the Planning Cmte on the webex vote. Ballots are submitted at the end of the webex.
2.) Delayed voting: Eligible members of the Planning Cmte may vote regardless of whether they attended the discussion. Ballots are submitted over the week following the webex.

Comments

Add your comments by editing this section.

Your name Date Comment Proposed Change
Example name May 12, 2015 Example Comment Proposed Change